Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/crypto/asn1/a_object.c	(working copy)
@@ -285,17 +285,29 @@ err:
 		ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret);
 	return(NULL);
 }
+
 ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, const unsigned char **pp,
 	     long len)
 	{
 	ASN1_OBJECT *ret=NULL;
 	const unsigned char *p;
-	int i;
-	/* Sanity check OID encoding: can't have leading 0x80 in
-	 * subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
+	int i, length;
+
+	/* Sanity check OID encoding.
+	 * Need at least one content octet.
+	 * MSB must be clear in the last octet.
+	 * can't have leading 0x80 in subidentifiers, see: X.690 8.19.2
 	 */
-	for (i = 0, p = *pp; i < len; i++, p++)
+	if (len <= 0 || len > INT_MAX || pp == NULL || (p = *pp) == NULL ||
+	    p[len - 1] & 0x80)
 		{
+		ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
+		return NULL;
+		}
+	/* Now 0 < len <= INT_MAX, so the cast is safe. */
+	length = (int)len;
+	for (i = 0; i < length; i++, p++)
+		{
 		if (*p == 0x80 && (!i || !(p[-1] & 0x80)))
 			{
 			ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT,ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING);
@@ -313,20 +325,20 @@ ASN1_OBJECT *c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a, cons
 	else	ret=(*a);
 
 	p= *pp;
-	if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < len))
+	if ((ret->data == NULL) || (ret->length < length))
 		{
 		if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data);
-		ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(len ? (int)len : 1);
+		ret->data=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(length);
 		ret->flags|=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA;
 		if (ret->data == NULL)
 			{ i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; }
 		}
-	memcpy(ret->data,p,(int)len);
-	ret->length=(int)len;
+	memcpy(ret->data,p,length);
+	ret->length=length;
 	ret->sn=NULL;
 	ret->ln=NULL;
 	/* ret->flags=ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC; we know it is dynamic */
-	p+=len;
+	p+=length;
 
 	if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret;
 	*pp=p;
Index: crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c	(working copy)
@@ -444,12 +444,13 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
 	unsigned char *p;
 	char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i)+DECIMAL_SIZE(l)+2];
 
-	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) {
-		buf[0]='\0';
+	/* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */
+	if (buf && buf_len > 0)
+		buf[0] = '\0';
+
+	if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
 		return(0);
-	}
 
-
 	if (!no_name && (nid=OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef)
 		{
 		const char *s;
@@ -527,9 +528,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
 				i=(int)(l/40);
 				l-=(long)(i*40);
 				}
-			if (buf && (buf_len > 0))
+			if (buf && (buf_len > 1))
 				{
 				*buf++ = i + '0';
+				*buf = '\0';
 				buf_len--;
 				}
 			n++;
@@ -544,9 +546,10 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1
 			i = strlen(bndec);
 			if (buf)
 				{
-				if (buf_len > 0)
+				if (buf_len > 1)
 					{
 					*buf++ = '.';
+					*buf = '\0';
 					buf_len--;
 					}
 				BUF_strlcpy(buf,bndec,buf_len);
@@ -786,4 +789,3 @@ err:
 	OPENSSL_free(buf);
 	return(ok);
 	}
-
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_both.c	(working copy)
@@ -581,30 +581,33 @@ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(SSL *s, long max,
 		return 0;
 	}
 
+/* dtls1_max_handshake_message_len returns the maximum number of bytes
+ * permitted in a DTLS handshake message for |s|. The minimum is 16KB, but may
+ * be greater if the maximum certificate list size requires it. */
+static unsigned long dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(const SSL *s)
+	{
+	unsigned long max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+	if (max_len < (unsigned long)s->max_cert_list)
+		return s->max_cert_list;
+	return max_len;
+	}
 
 static int
-dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_reassemble_fragment(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 	{
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
 	pitem *item = NULL;
 	int i = -1, is_complete;
 	PQ_64BIT seq64;
-	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len, max_len;
+	unsigned long frag_len = msg_hdr->frag_len;
 
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > msg_hdr->msg_len ||
+	    msg_hdr->msg_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
 		goto err;
 
-	/* Determine maximum allowed message size. Depends on (user set)
-	 * maximum certificate length, but 16k is minimum.
-	 */
-	if (DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH < s->max_cert_list)
-		max_len = s->max_cert_list;
-	else
-		max_len = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH;
+	if (frag_len == 0)
+		return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
-	if ((msg_hdr->frag_off+frag_len) > max_len)
-		goto err;
-
 	/* Try to find item in queue */
 	pq_64bit_init(&seq64);
 	pq_64bit_assign_word(&seq64, msg_hdr->seq);
@@ -633,7 +636,8 @@ static int
 
 
 	/* If message is already reassembled, this must be a
-	 * retransmit and can be dropped.
+	 * retransmit and can be dropped. In this case item != NULL and so frag
+	 * does not need to be freed.
 	 */
 	if (frag->reassembly == NULL)
 		{
@@ -653,7 +657,9 @@ static int
 	/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read */
 	i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 		frag->fragment + msg_hdr->frag_off,frag_len,0);
-	if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+	if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+		i=-1;
+	if (i<=0)
 		goto err;
 
 	RSMBLY_BITMASK_MARK(frag->reassembly, (long)msg_hdr->frag_off,
@@ -681,14 +687,18 @@ static int
 			goto err;
 			}
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it and control
+		 * would never have reached this branch. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if (frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if (item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
@@ -695,7 +705,7 @@ err:
 
 
 static int
-dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
+dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message(SSL *s, const struct hm_header_st* msg_hdr, int *ok)
 {
 	int i=-1;
 	hm_fragment *frag = NULL;
@@ -715,7 +725,7 @@ static int
 	/* If we already have an entry and this one is a fragment,
 	 * don't discard it and rather try to reassemble it.
 	 */
-	if (item != NULL && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+	if (item != NULL && frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 		item = NULL;
 
 	/* Discard the message if sequence number was already there, is
@@ -740,9 +750,12 @@ static int
 		}
 	else
 		{
-		if (frag_len && frag_len < msg_hdr->msg_len)
+		if (frag_len != msg_hdr->msg_len)
 			return dtls1_reassemble_fragment(s, msg_hdr, ok);
 
+		if (frag_len > dtls1_max_handshake_message_len(s))
+			goto err;
+
 		frag = dtls1_hm_fragment_new(frag_len, 0);
 		if ( frag == NULL)
 			goto err;
@@ -754,7 +767,9 @@ static int
 			/* read the body of the fragment (header has already been read) */
 			i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE,
 				frag->fragment,frag_len,0);
-			if (i<=0 || (unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+			if ((unsigned long)i!=frag_len)
+				i = -1;
+			if (i<=0)
 				goto err;
 			}
 
@@ -766,14 +781,21 @@ static int
 		if ( item == NULL)
 			goto err;
 
-		pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		item = pqueue_insert(s->d1->buffered_messages, item);
+		/* pqueue_insert fails iff a duplicate item is inserted.
+		 * However, |item| cannot be a duplicate. If it were,
+		 * |pqueue_find|, above, would have returned it. Then, either
+		 * |frag_len| != |msg_hdr->msg_len| in which case |item| is set
+		 * to NULL and it will have been processed with
+		 * |dtls1_reassemble_fragment|, above, or the record will have
+		 * been discarded. */
+		OPENSSL_assert(item != NULL);
 		}
 
 	return DTLS1_HM_FRAGMENT_RETRY;
 
 err:
-	if ( frag != NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
-	if ( item != NULL) OPENSSL_free(item);
+	if (frag != NULL && item == NULL) dtls1_hm_fragment_free(frag);
 	*ok = 0;
 	return i;
 	}
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/d1_clnt.c	(working copy)
@@ -796,6 +796,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
@@ -986,6 +993,13 @@ int dtls1_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			{
 			DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt;
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL)
 				dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp;
 			else
@@ -1226,5 +1240,3 @@ int dtls1_send_client_certificate(SSL *s)
 	/* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */
 	return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE));
 	}
-
-
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s23_srvr.c	(working copy)
@@ -328,16 +328,12 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have
 			 * to read more records to find out.
 			 * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this,
-			 * so we simply assume TLS 1.0 to avoid protocol version downgrade
-			 * attacks. */
+			 * so we simply reject such connections to avoid
+			 * protocol version downgrade attacks. */
 			if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6)
 				{
-#if 0
 				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL);
 				goto err;
-#else
-				v[1] = TLS1_VERSION_MINOR;
-#endif
 				}
 			/* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value
 			 * which will use the highest version 3 we support.
@@ -344,7 +340,7 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			 * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise
 			 * this....
 			 */
-			else if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
+			if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR)
 				v[1]=0xff;
 			else
 				v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */
@@ -412,6 +408,18 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 		v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */
 		v[1] = p[4];
 
+		/* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2
+		 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS
+		 * record. It's format is:
+		 * Byte  Content
+		 * 0-1   msg_length
+		 * 2     msg_type
+		 * 3-4   version
+		 * 5-6   cipher_spec_length
+		 * 7-8   session_id_length
+		 * 9-10  challenge_length
+		 * ...   ...
+		 */
 		n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1];
 		if (n > (1024*4))
 			{
@@ -418,8 +426,16 @@ int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s)
 			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE);
 			goto err;
 			}
+		if (n < 9)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+			goto err;
+			}
 
 		j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2);
+		/* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have
+		 * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid
+		 * packet bytes. */
 		if (j <= 0) return(j);
 
 		ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2);
Index: crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c
===================================================================
--- crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c	(revision 270128)
+++ crypto/openssl/ssl/s3_clnt.c	(working copy)
@@ -1915,6 +1915,13 @@ int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 			RSA *rsa;
 			unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
 
+			if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)
+				{
+				/* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */
+				SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+				goto err;
+				}
+
 			if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL)
 				rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp;
 			else
